Abbas wins a popular mandate

Jan 14th 2005
From The Economist Global Agenda

Palestinian voters have given Mahmoud Abbas a clear mandate to govern—and to negotiate with Israel and America. But will he use it well? And will either Israel or the Palestinian militants give him a chance?

IT WAS a rare sight to behold: Arabs queuing at polling booths in a presidential election in which they had a genuine choice of candidates. In a ballot to choose a successor to the late Yasser Arafat as president of the Palestinian Authority (PA), on Sunday January 9th, about two-thirds of voters in the West Bank, Gaza strip and East Jerusalem turned out to vote, according to Palestinian officials (though critics have raised various questions about these figures—for example, noting a large discrepancy between the 1.7m or so theoretically entitled to vote and the 1.1m or so who made it onto the electoral rolls). Arafat’s long-time deputy, Mahmoud Abbas, also known as Abu Mazen, won a sweeping victory, with 62.3% of the votes cast. His nearest rival, Mustafa Barghouti, an independent human-rights activist and anti-corruption campaigner, got a respectable 20% or so: enough to help legitimise the contest, though not enough to undermine Mr Abbas’s mandate.

President George Bush hailed the election as “further proof” of his belief that people in the Middle East are thirsting for democracy. The turnout was as high as anyone had expected, despite a boycott by Hamas and other Islamist militants, who oppose Mr Abbas’s calls for them to end their four-year-old armed intifada. Indeed, Mr Abbas might now be said to have a stronger mandate than either Mr Bush (who won only 51% of votes in November’s election) or the Israeli prime minister, Ariel Sharon (whose Likud party won less than a third of the vote in the last election, in 2003). Despite problems at a few polling booths, international observers said voting was largely free and fair.

Whereas Mr Bush and Mr Sharon had stopped talking to Arafat, blaming his inadequate efforts to rein in the militants, they have signalled their willingness to negotiate with Mr Abbas. He has long been among the most moderate of Palestinian leaders. He resigned as Arafat’s prime minister in 2003 partly because of his boss’s failure to reform the PA’s faction-ridden security services. His election is widely seen as a chance to revive the moribund Middle East peace process. Shimon Peres, the leader of Israel’s Labour Party (who was sworn in as Israel's vice-premier after his party joined Likud in a new national-unity government on Monday evening) said: “A moderate man was elected, an intelligent man, an experienced man. Let’s give him a chance…There is a new legitimate Palestinian leadership whose leaders definitely are against terror and war.”

But though this is the best opportunity for peace talks in years, it is not necessarily a very good one. First, Mr Abbas will indeed need the Israelis to give him a chance if he is to get anywhere. Israel wants him to crack down on Palestinian militants, as proof that he can guarantee its security if it cedes control of the occupied territories. But for all the votes he won, Mr Abbas will find it difficult to do that. Though opinion polls have shown most Palestinians to be war-weary and keen for reconciliation with Israel, they also show that a majority think that violence has so far achieved more than negotiations. Mr Abbas, therefore, rather than trying to stamp out the militants, hopes to persuade them to call a truce. To do that, he will need to show that he can get something from Israel in return. If Israel were to release more of the 7,000 or so Palestinian prisoners it holds (it let out 159 in late December) and eased its restrictions at military checkpoints, this might encourage the insurgents to heed Mr Abbas’s calls to halt their attacks.

The last attempt at a truce, brokered by Mr Abbas in 2003, quickly collapsed into a cycle of attack and counter-attack. That Mr Abbas now has a direct mandate from the Palestinian people should help him this time. But as if to underline how impotent he could be, all through the election campaign—indeed on polling day itself—militants in the Gaza strip continued to fire rockets at Jewish settlements and into Israel proper, prompting the usual harsh retaliation by Israeli forces. On Thursday, in what seemed a calculated riposte to Mr Abbas's ceasefire call, militants killed six Israelis in a suicide bombing at one of Gaza's main border crossings. Three organisations claimed joint responsibility, including the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, an armed group linked to Mr Abbas's own Fatah party.

Assuming Mr Abbas does achieve a truce that lasts long enough for peace negotiations to get started, it is far from clear that such talks will lead anywhere. Though he has angered militants by calling for an end to their attacks, he also infuriated the Israelis during his campaign by referring to them as the “Zionist enemy” and by reasserting the “right of return” for Palestinians who fled what is now Israel at its birth in 1948. Of all the Palestinians’ traditional demands, this is among the least likely that Israel would ever concede.

Some Israeli leaders have taken Mr Abbas’s comments as a sign that he will be little different from Arafat. Others hope that Mr Abbas’s true position on the refugee question is not what he said in his fiery stump speeches but what he wrote in his manifesto, which talks of “a fair resolution according to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194”—diplomatic code for “let’s discuss it”.

Turbulent times ahead

Both the Palestinian and Israeli leaders will have to pilot their new administrations through a stormy summer. Beginning in June, Mr Sharon aims to carry out his controversial “disengagement” plan to withdraw Jewish settlers and Israeli troops from the Gaza strip and part of the West Bank. Most Israelis, weary at the human and financial costs of maintaining the settlements there, want this to happen. So would most Palestinians, as long as it were the first step in an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories and not simply a tactical retreat to reinforce the occupation of the rest of the West Bank.

However, the pull-out plan is at serious risk of being wrecked by hardliners on both sides. Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups are keen to make it look like they drove the Israelis out. If they continue launching attacks in the run-up to the withdrawal, this will only increase the opposition that Mr Sharon faces from settler groups and their supporters.
Meanwhile, Mr Abbas and Fatah, which has long dominated Palestinian politics, face an increasing challenge from other players—Hamas among them—in municipal and legislative elections spread over the coming months. And he himself could be much weakened within Fatah if he fails to deliver progress by the time of a crucial party congress in August.

On winning his own election two months ago, Mr Bush pledged to seek an independent Palestinian state by the end of his term of office in four years’ time. Such high hopes have of course been raised and dashed many times before. The chance of success this time round will depend on many things, including how much pressure Mr Bush and other world leaders put on both sides to seek a deal. Most importantly, it will depend on how much courage Mr Abbas and Mr Sharon each show in facing down their hardliners while persuading their people that a peace with uncomfortable compromises is better than eternal conflict.

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