Iraq’s Shias go from exclusion to dominance

Feb 17th 2005
From The Economist print edition

An alliance loyal to Iraq’s top Shia Muslim cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, has won the largest number of seats in Iraq’s parliamentary elections. But it will need to form a coalition with other groups to govern the country—the broader the better, to avert a civil war

IRAQ’S Shia Muslims have had a long time to repent their boycott of the country’s first multi-party elections, held in 1924, four years after Iraq was carved out of the collapsed Ottoman Empire. For the following 80 years they were excluded from power, despite greatly outnumbering all other groups, and suffered repression under successive governments mainly drawn from the Sunni Arab minority. This time, the Shias, especially their most influential cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, were determined not to repeat their historic mistake. In the parliamentary elections in late January—the country’s first genuine ones in half a century—droves of Shia voters defied the insurgents’ death threats and followed Mr Sistani’s fatwa instructing them to cast their ballots. The final results, announced on Thursday February 17th, showed that the United Iraqi Alliance, a Shia-led group of parties that claimed the endorsement of Mr Sistani and other Shia mullahs (and thus was nicknamed the “clerics’ list”), came well ahead of all rivals. However, with 140 seats, it will have only a slender majority in the new, 275-seat parliament and will thus have to seek a broader coalition.

What may turn out to be an extensive period of haggling is under way, with the leaders of the clerics’ list and the other various groups that won seats seeking to trade powerful jobs in the new government for support in the parliament. The Shias, who are around three-fifths of Iraq’s population of about 27m, have gone from being excluded from power to being over-represented in the parliament. This is because many of the Sunni Arabs, who dominated the country until the toppling of Saddam Hussein, despite being only about a fifth of the population, either boycotted the elections or were prevented from voting by the insurgency, which is raging most fiercely in Sunni-majority areas. The electoral commission said that, nationwide, around 58% of the 15m registered voters turned out. However, in Sunni-dominated provinces, the turnout was markedly lower: though in Salahadin it reached 29%, in Anbar province it was a pitiful 2%.

Iraq’s Kurds—a further fifth of the population, mostly of the Sunni faith but distinct ethnically from the Arabs—also turned out in force to vote. The grand alliance formed between the main Kurdish parties won the second-largest share of the vote. The Kurds, like the Shias, also now go from excluded to over-represented. They have their eyes on the largely ceremonial job of Iraqi president, currently held by Ghazi al-Yawar, a Sunni. Mr Yawar’s Iraqiyun List is the main Sunni group in the new parliament, though with just five seats. A secular group led by Adnan Pachachi, a Sunni tribal leader, did poorly and did not get a single seat.

The Iraqi List, a Shia-led but more secular alliance headed by Iyad Allawi, the interim prime minister, trailed behind the Kurds in third place. Thus Mr Allawi is now likely to lose his job, though he will try to persuade the other parties that, given his close links with senior military officers and his fairly good relations with Sunni leaders, he is best placed to hold the country together. This may not wash with the parties belonging to the clerics’ list, who are pushing several of their own candidates for prime minister. Of these, the front-runner seems to be Ibrahim al-Jaafari, the leader of the Dawa party.

Under Iraq’s interim constitution, the new assembly has to choose a president and two vice-presidents by a two-thirds majority (ie, 184 of the 275 seats), who between them choose a prime minister and cabinet, who must then win the support of a simple majority in the parliament. All this may not happen until late March. Between them, the clerics’ list and the Kurdish Alliance would have a two-thirds majority, though the parties and individuals who came together to form each electoral alliance will not necessarily stick together in the current horse-trading.

Once it has approved the new government, one of the parliament’s main jobs will be to draw up a new constitution. If all goes well, this will be put to voters in a referendum possibly in October. If two-thirds of voters in each of three provinces reject the constitution, it will have to be rewritten—thus giving the Sunnis and Kurds the power of veto, despite the Shias’ dominance of the parliament. Thus it is vital that the main Sunni groups which boycotted the elections be persuaded to take part in drawing up the constitution. Though the Sunnis will have precious few seats, one of their number may be made the speaker of the new parliament, an important role that should help guarantee them some influence in drafting the constitution. Once it has been approved in a referendum, there will be another general election, perhaps in December, in which, if all goes well, there may be wider Sunni participation.

America and its allies would probably prefer to see Mr Allawi continue in power. But even if Mr Jaafari or someone like him emerges as Iraq’s new leader, it will not be such a disappointing outcome for the coalition that brought Iraq an election through military might. Though Mr Jaafari is an Islamist, he appears to understand the need to include all the country’s main groups in decision-making. The chances are that the new government will not be a close ally of America—indeed, to establish its credibility, both among Iraqis and among the wider Arab and Muslim world, it would be wise for it to show a degree of independence. But it seems unlikely to be openly hostile to America or the West in general. There is a fair chance it will be broadly democratic and inclusive, setting a positive example to the whole region, as America has been hoping.

Once the haggling ends and a government is chosen, there are still many bitter battles to be fought—with luck, political battles rather than the military sort. What will be the role of Islam, and of the senior clerics, in framing the country’s laws? How much autonomy will the Kurds and indeed other groups be allowed? How will the country’s oil revenues be shared between the federal government and the provinces? And should some sort of timetable or limit be set for the withdrawal of foreign troops? While Iraq’s newly elected parliamentarians dispute such matters, the insurgents—who are far from beaten yet—will continue to do their utmost to stamp out the shoots of Iraqi democracy before they have a chance to take root.

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