Worries about weapons, contd

Feb 24th 2005
From The Economist Global Agenda

America is angry that the European Union plans to lift an embargo on sales of weaponry to China, which in turn is angry that Japan and America have identified Taiwan as a joint security concern

DESPITE all the fence-mending that has taken place during George Bush’s tour of Europe, some transatlantic disagreements could not be prevented from spilling into the open. The most awkwardly visible of these is the European Union’s planned lifting of its embargo on arms sales to China, which the United States opposes. On Tuesday February 22nd, Mr Bush said that: “There is deep concern in our country that a transfer of weapons would be a transfer of technology to China which would change the balance of relations between China and Taiwan.” If the EU went ahead with the lifting of the ban, he added, it would have to “sell it” to America’s Congress, which, he suggested, might retaliate with restrictions on technology transfers to Europe.

The EU will lift its Chinese arms embargo, introduced after the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, later this year. This, the Union hopes, will open the door not only to profitable weapons sales but to closer trade relations in general with an emerging economic superpower. In an effort to assuage American concerns, the Europeans say they will limit the transfer of advanced technology by strengthening their “code of conduct” for arms sales; and that they will inform the Americans of any arms sales that would have been prohibited under the embargo. This week, France’s President Jacques Chirac said the embargo would be lifted under conditions that Europe and the United States “define together”.

That looks like wishful thinking. American opposition to lifting the ban runs deep. The Bush administration fears that it might enable the Chinese to develop the kind of sophisticated military systems used in Iraq by America and its closest allies. It also worries that these could be passed from China to rogue states or groups. Earlier this month, Congress voted overwhelmingly to condemn the EU’s planned lifting of the embargo. Some American politicians point out that the Chinese human-rights abuses that led to the embargo, such as the detention of dissidents, remain a serious worry. Others focus on regional security. Writing in the Wall Street Journal this week, Henry Hyde, chairman of the House of Representatives’ international-relations committee, said: “EU security policy toward China is on a collision course with America’s extensive security interests in Asia.”

At the centre of those interests lies Taiwan. Since the mid-1990s, China has been engaged in a rapid military build-up on the coast facing the island, which Beijing views as a rebellious province. This has increased tensions with America, which is legally committed (under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979) to provide Taiwan with the means to defend itself. Although the Americans have recently appeared to play down this obligation, military confrontation with nuclear-armed China over Taiwan is all too possible. Some worry that all it would take is a miscalculation or misunderstanding.

In 1995 and 1996 China staged large-scale military manoeuvres in the Taiwan Strait, including firing unarmed missiles close to Taiwan's two main ports. China has fired no more missiles since, but has positioned large numbers of truck-mounted short-range ballistic missiles along the coast. It has also increased deployments of longer-range missiles that could target American bases in Japan or on the Pacific island of Guam, about 1,500 miles from Taiwan. And it is working to develop land-attack cruise missiles, which could be fired across the 100-mile strait and penetrate even the most sophisticated anti-missile defences that Taiwan is acquiring from America.

Under Bill Clinton, America stepped up contacts with the Taiwanese armed forces. In 2001, after Mr Bush became president, the Republican administration further strengthened these ties. Mr Bush also offered to sell Taiwan a huge package of advanced weaponry and help it buy submarines. Reports suggest that there are now more American military programmes in progress with Taiwan than with any other American ally.

Though Taiwan has run its own affairs for more than half a century, China continually threatens to retake it by force if it ever formally declares independence. Taiwan has enjoyed de facto independence since the end of the Chinese civil war in 1949, when Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist forces retreated to the island after being defeated on the mainland by Mao Zedong’s Communists. Nowadays, most western countries do not formally recognise Taiwan as an independent country, though in practice they deal with it as if it were.

A more assertive neighbour

Unlike America, Japan has stepped gingerly around the issue of Taiwan in recent years, which is why Beijing reacted so angrily to the new joint security arrangement between Japan and America that was announced on February 19th. The two called on China to be more open about its military affairs and, for the first time, Japan said it viewed Taiwan as a shared security concern with the United States—in the past they have preferred to waffle on about dealing with problems “in areas surrounding Japan”. China barked back that the statement violated its sovereignty. The kerfuffle has strained Beijing’s ties with Tokyo and Washington at a time when the three are supposed to be working together (along with South Korea and Russia) to curb North Korea’s nuclear ambitions.

Japan’s increased assertiveness is all the more unsettling for China because of Japan’s plans to reform its pacifist constitution and modernise the role of the Self-Defence Force (its de facto military). A relaxation of the constitution would make it easier in principle for Japan to participate in overseas military actions (it has already sent non-combat troops to Iraq). This could remove an obstacle to Japanese forces helping America protect Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attempt to invade the island.

China’s relations with Japan and America could deteriorate further in March when, at its next annual plenary meeting, China’s National People's Congress (the legislature) may enact an anti-secession law. This would give China, at least from its own perspective, a stronger legal basis for invading Taiwan. On Thursday, Taiwan's top policymaker on China, Joseph Wu, gave warning that enactment of the law could lead to the postponement of projects aimed at deepening economic integration with the mainland. China and Taiwan recently exchanged direct charter flights for the first time in 56 years, and Taiwan is considering easing barriers to investment in China by chipmakers, banks and chemicals firms. With this is mind, the Chinese might balk at implementing such provocative legislation. Reclaiming Taiwan by a process of slow economic assimilation is just as much a part of China’s long-term strategy as is military aggression.

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