Point of no return?

Apr 19th 2005
From The Economist Global Agenda

At a meeting in Delhi, the leaders of India and Pakistan have declared that their peace process is now “irreversible”. Not so. But with the two nuclear-armed countries now prepared to compromise on previously entrenched positions, a settlement over the disputed territory of Kashmir is no longer unimaginable

RARELY have hopes for a lasting peace between India and Pakistan seemed so bright. Pakistan’s president, General Pervez Musharraf, this week paid his first visit to India since a disastrous summit in 2001. This time, an international cricket match gave the excuse for an “informal” visit that nevertheless bore all the trappings of a summit. It achieved no great breakthrough but, if General Musharraf and India’s prime minister, Manmohan Singh, are right, managed something even better: to show that “the peace process was now irreversible”.

It is not, of course. As General Musharraf himself pointed out, in the absence of a “final settlement”, the dispute over which the two countries have fought three wars, Kashmir, could erupt again at any time. For the time being, however, both countries are preoccupied not with the risk of renewed conflict, but with the potential benefits of peace.

The co-operative mood had been set by the opening, on April 7th, of a bus route between Srinagar, capital of Indian-held Kashmir, and Muzaffarabad, capital of the Pakistani part, for the first time since partition in 1947. Pakistan joined India in condemning an attack on some of the buses’ passengers on the eve of their departure from Srinagar. The service brought the hope of reunion to separated Kashmiri families, but also had huge symbolic importance. It showed that both countries were prepared to compromise on long-held positions: Pakistan on its objection to an arrangement that might be seen as turning the “line of control” that divides Kashmir into an international border; India on its original insistence that passengers would have to carry passports.

In Delhi, General Musharraf and Mr Singh agreed to increase the frequency of the buses, which initially will travel only once a fortnight. They also agreed to let goods lorries ply the route, to open others and to agree meeting points along the line of control for divided families and trade. The hope is that a “soft border” will both improve the lives of Kashmiris on either side and bring a final settlement closer. Beyond Kashmir, there were moves designed to promote bilateral trade, such as reactivating a moribund joint economic commission. A dispute over a dam being built in Indian Kashmir—the trickiest bilateral economic issue of the moment—was simply ignored in the leaders’ joint statement.

All of this fits in with a strategy pursued by India since Mr Singh’s predecessor, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, whom General Musharraf also visited, offered Pakistan “the hand of friendship” two years ago. It has sought to build confidence through increasing contacts, expanding economic ties, and taking advantage of the popularity in both countries of moves towards peace.

In doing so, it has had to counter the suspicions of many in Pakistan and Kashmir that India was seeking to enmesh Pakistan in a spider’s web of minor accords without ever tackling the central dispute: Kashmir. Both countries claim all of the territory, though India has long let it be known that it would settle for the status quo. Many in Kashmir itself, however, yearn for independence from both countries. For 15 years, the Indian part has suffered a bloody insurgency, abetted by Pakistan.

In Delhi, General Musharraf met separatist leaders from Indian-held Kashmir. Moderates among them have welcomed recent peace moves, while bemoaning the lack of a Kashmiri seat at the negotiating table. But hardliners accused General Musharraf of betrayal. No longer, as they would like, and as Pakistan used to argue, is a settlement of the dispute seen as a precondition to improved relations. Rather, it is hoped that, in a benign bilateral climate, a solution might emerge.

That still looks a tall order. General Musharraf argued that the route to a settlement would have to stay within three guidelines: India’s insistence that no boundaries can be redrawn; Pakistan’s refusal to accept the line of control; and the two countries’ agreement that borders must become less important. But the first two of these are mutually incompatible; and the flexibility and vagueness needed to blur the contradiction seem at odds with General Musharraf’s insistence that there must be a “final settlement”.

Yet the two leaders have agreed that they will not “allow terrorism to impede the peace process”. That is a striking promise, implying both that Pakistan is distancing itself further from “freedom fighters” in Kashmir, and that India is not going to react to every terrorist attack as if it were an act of Pakistani aggression. True peace may be a long way off, but the threat of war is no longer just one atrocity away.

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