A chance for peace—but some big obstacles

Jul 20th 2005
From The Economist Global Agenda

Negotiators representing the Indonesian government and rebels in Aceh have agreed a formula to end the breakaway province’s deadly 30-year conflict. However, peace hopes have been raised and dashed before—and there are still some serious obstacles

PERHAPS as many as 12,000 people, most of them civilians, have lost their lives since the mid-1970s, when the conflict between government troops and separatist rebels in Indonesia’s westernmost province of Aceh began—or more accurately, resumed, for the Acehnese had fought Dutch colonial rule as far back as the late 19th century. An even worse disaster was visited upon the troubled province last December 26th, when a huge tsunami, caused by an undersea quake off its Indian Ocean coast, swept away perhaps 170,000 of its residents and left around 600,000 homeless, also causing death and destruction as far away as Africa.

A few weeks after the tsunami struck, a new round of peace talks began, sponsored by Finland. One of the main obstacles to a settlement was cleared early in the talks, when the rebel Free Aceh Movement (GAM) dropped its demand for full independence for the province. And, meeting in Helsinki on Sunday July 17th, representatives of the two sides announced that they had arrived at a formula for disarming the militants and reintegrating them into civil society, withdrawing non-local Indonesian troops and monitoring a ceasefire, which they intend to sign on August 15th.

Given that many of the province’s main towns are still devastated following the tsunami, and considering how quickly a previous peace accord, in 2002, fell apart, it perhaps should not be surprising that this breakthrough was met with a muted reaction in Aceh. The fighting has gone on, intermittently, since the talks began and continued this week despite the announcement of the peace deal. Will the men with guns on either side really pay heed to the fine words of the delegates in far-off Helsinki, locals wondered?

There are certainly reasons for pessimism. Though the Indonesian government has given some ground on the rebels’ demands for political representation, it appears (full details of the peace proposal are not yet known) that they will not yet be allowed to form a local political party, as they are demanding. This would mean changing an Indonesian law that forbids all regional parties. Indonesia’s vice-president Jusuf Kalla, who has been overseeing the government’s participation in the talks, has hinted that GAM might at first be allowed to set up a nationwide party under the existing law—though that would require it to set up branches in at least half of the country’s 33 provinces. In time, when the law was changed, a local Aceh party might then be permitted.

Rebel commanders in the field may take some convincing that such vague-sounding commitments are enough. The continuing unrest in Aceh has provided a handy cover for members of both the rebel group and some local army units to engage in lucrative smuggling, drug-running and extortion rackets—which means that some on each side have an interest in seeing the peace process fail, on whatever excuse.

The army’s powerful chiefs may take some convincing that a deal with the rebels—as opposed to launching another military campaign to wipe them out—is in Indonesia’s best interests. They are bound to worry that, having already “lost” East Timor (which has occupied by Indonesia until its vote for independence in 1999), the country could fall apart if too many concessions are now made to the separatists in Aceh. The sprawling Indonesian archipelago is made up of a number of formerly independent states that were colonised by the Dutch until 1945, when the Indonesian republic was formed; several provinces already have separatist movements and the generals’ fear is that concessions to GAM may encourage others.

However, there are also some grounds for optimism. Previous, unsuccessful rounds of talks mainly concentrated on achieving a ceasefire, rather than making serious progress on the difficult questions of Aceh’s final status. Besides the rebels’ abandonment (for now at least) of their independence demand and the government’s move on political representation for the rebels, there are also signs that the authorities in the Indonesian capital, Jakarta, are more committed to a settlement of the Aceh question than before. Since a mass uprising forced the authoritarian President Suharto from office in 1998, Indonesia has been transformed from a quasi-dictatorship into a multi-party democracy. Last year, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, a charismatic retired general, won the country’s first direct election for president. His Democrat Party lacks a majority in parliament, which will have to approve any peace deal. But it is in coalition with the largest party, Golkar, headed by Mr Kalla, which should help the prospects of approval.

The widespread international attention paid to Aceh after the tsunami may have helped to persuade the government, and indeed the rebels, to try a little harder to reach a deal. The European Union and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) will help monitor the proposed ceasefire (the EU’s first such venture into Asia). On Wednesday, Indonesia announced some details of the timing of the proposed demilitarisation of Aceh: army troops would pull back, while GAM rebels would hand in their weapons, in the period between mid-September and the end of December.

Apart from ending the bloodshed in Aceh, a lasting peace deal could bring broader benefits. A planned $5 billion post-tsunami reconstruction programme, largely funded by foreign donors, would be much easier to carry out if there were peace in the province. Aceh’s oil and other plentiful natural resources could be better exploited, bringing prosperity to the region. Peace in Aceh might even reduce piracy in the Malacca Strait—one of the world’s most important shipping lanes, between Indonesia and the southern tip of Malaysia—as well as diminishing an Islamist insurgency in southern Thailand, since many of the Malacca pirates, and the Thai insurgents’ arms, are said to come from Aceh. Last but not least, ending a long-running conflict by civilised means, rather than brute force, would set a wonderful example across the whole of South-East Asia and beyond.

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