Many suspects, few certainties

Jul 28th 2005
From The Economist Global Agenda

It remains unclear who carried out the bombing of the Egyptian Red Sea resort of Sharm el-Sheikh, killing dozens of people, mostly locals. Whoever turns out to have been behind the attack, it is unlikely to encourage President Hosni Mubarak to push on with the limited political reforms made so far

LITTLE has been clarified since the series of explosions that blasted through the Egyptian tourist resort of Sharm el-Sheikh, on the Red Sea, in the early hours of Saturday July 23rd. It is not even clear how many people were killed in the attacks: by Saturday, hospital officials were talking of 88 dead, though the government later revised the figure down. The current known death toll is approaching 70. Though the resort is packed with foreigners at this time of year, most of the victims are thought to be Egyptians. Whatever the final toll, the bombings were the worst terrorist attacks Egypt has suffered in more than 20 years—and caused greater loss of life than the similar bombings of other Egyptian resorts last October, in which 34 people died.

There seem to have been three explosions, each now thought to have been suicide-bombings, though the details are still sketchy. A pick-up truck loaded with explosives is thought to have been driven into the lobby of the Ghazala Gardens Hotel, ripping off its façade. Another bomb, possibly in a suitcase, is thought to have gone off in a car park nearby. And there was a third explosion in a shopping area—officials said this was a car bomb, though there was at least one report that the third bomber had arrived on foot.

Least certain of all, at this stage, is who was responsible. So far, five groups have claimed to be behind the bombings, ranging from an al-Qaeda-linked organisation claiming to be avenging the foreign occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan to a hitherto-unknown local group protesting at the Egyptian government's treatment of locals after last October's bombings. Following the October bombings—at Taba and on two beaches to the south of the resort, also on the Red Sea—there were claims of responsibility by two unknown Islamist groups. But the Egyptian government concluded after an inquiry that the October 2004 bombings had been carried out by an unaffiliated group, led by a Palestinian.

On Monday the Pakistani authorities—who are already embarrassed at the links that some of the London suicide-bombers had with Pakistan—reacted with indignation to reports that the Egyptian authorities were pursuing a number of Pakistanis, possibly with al-Qaeda links, over the bombings. This prompted Egypt to backtrack: while its police had issued photographs of a group of Pakistanis that had gone missing from Sharm el-Sheikh after the bombings, these were not being treated as prime suspects. Some reports suggested they may simply have fled because they had been working illegally.

Of all the possibilities, one of the most likely is that the bombs were at least planted, if not planned, by a local group with roots among the Bedouin of the Sinai peninsula—a group that for centuries fiercely resisted foreign presence and influence over their desert land. On Monday, Egyptian police said they were met with gunfire when they went to Bedouin villages in the mountains near Sharm el-Sheikh, to see if the bombers might be sheltering there. Police were reported to be taking DNA samples from some local families, to try to establish both the identities of the Sharm el-Sheikh suicide bombers and any links with the Taba bombers.

Back in the early 1990s Egypt's security forces crushed a low-level Islamist insurgency but support for Islamist groups, who oppose Egypt’s friendly relations with Israel and the West, remains strong. Besides these motives and the alleged ill-treatment of locals after the Taba bombings, there is also said to be simmering resentment among Sinai's bedouins at how they live in relative poverty while rich and well-connected developers make a fortune from their peninsula's prime beaches.

If the bombers were locals, their local knowledge and contacts will have helped them get through the supposedly strict security that surrounds Egypt’s Red Sea resorts. On the other hand, the scale and co-ordination of the two sets of bombings suggests some sort of involvement by a larger, outside group. But then why would al-Qaeda or some other international terror group concentrate its most spectacular attacks on this rather peripheral chunk of Egyptian territory when there are plenty of vulnerable tourist and other foreign targets in the country’s heartland?

Amid all the confusion, two things at least seem clear. One is that Egypt’s economy will suffer from the bombings, given the country’s dependence on tourism (though economists and travel firms said they hoped the impact would be temporary). The horrific stories recounted by holidaymakers of the carnage and panic in Sharm el-Sheikh are bound to make many would-be visitors think twice. France and America have encouraged their citizens to take their holidays elsewhere.

Another is that the attacks will make President Hosni Mubarak more resistant to American pressure to continue his thus-far modest political reforms. After Saturday’s bombings, the Egyptian authorities announced a date—September 7th—for the forthcoming presidential election and Mr Mubarak later confirmed that he will seek a fifth six-year term of office.

Under a recent constitutional amendment, rival candidates will be allowed to run for the presidency, though the amendment makes it so difficult for them to gain approval that Mr Mubarak seems unlikely to face a serious challenge. In the current climate it seems most unlikely that there will be any further moves toward genuine political pluralism. In the wake of the bombings Mr Mubarak summoned Arab leaders to an “exceptional” summit, to be held in Sharm el-Sheikh on August 3rd, to discuss Iraq, Palestine and terrorism. He has also promised a new anti-terror law in place of Egypt’s interminable “emergency” laws, which most often have been used to clamp down on Islamists, moderate as well as militant. But, once again, the chances of genuine change do not look good.

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