More jaw-jaw

Iraq

Aug 18th 2005 BAGHDAD
From The Economist print edition

Parliament dithers on

ON AUGUST 15th, barely 20 minutes short of a previous deadline, Iraq's parliament voted to give itself another week to agree on a new draft constitution. Had it not managed to agree to keep talking, the assembly would have dissolved in wretched failure. The postponement, which entailed an amendment to the country's American-approved Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), followed days of optimistic proclamations from politicians that a timely agreement would be reached by the country's main ethnic and sectarian blocs. But as the negotiations proceeded to unravel, such an agreement seemed hard to imagine.

In the weeks before the deadline, a rough consensus had emerged between two of the parliament's three main groups, the Shia Muslims and ethnic Kurds. For the Kurds, America's best ally in Iraq, the new constitution should be mainly based on the TAL—unsurprisingly, seeing as they largely wrote it. Yet they were also prepared to make concessions to the Shia, the country's majority group. Thus, for example, Iraq would remain a federal republic, but its revenues from oil, which is concentrated in the north and south, would be shared among the provinces according to population size.

The Kurds would remain autonomous in their northern redoubt, retaining control over their peshmerga militias. Kirkuk, an oil-rich province which both the Kurds and Sunni Arabs lay claim to, would be dealt with according to the TAL: the Kurds deported from the province by Saddam Hussein would be allowed to return, after which a referendum would be held on whether to include it in the Kurdish domain. Islam would meanwhile be the state religion, and the leading role of the Shia clergy acknowledged; but the country would not be run strictly according to Islamic law. Yet, as the deadline loomed, Kurdish and Shia politicians admitted that any number of these points were still under negotiation. And many Sunni rejected them altogether.

The Sunnis came late to the table, after a succession of disputes over how many of—and who among—their representatives would sit on the parliamentary committee negotiating the new draft constitution, as well as a short boycott after two Sunni delegates were assassinated. Moreover, many still cling to the vision of the Sunni-dominated old regime, insisting that Iraq be an “Arab Republic”—a non-starter with the Kurds—and flatly rejecting the notion of federalism. Other Sunni delegates accepted Kurdish autonomy as an established fact, but refused to countenance demands for a Shia-run autonomous region in the south. This, they said, would deprive the mostly Sunni centre of oil revenue, and also allow next-door Iran's Shia rulers to meddle in Iraq's affairs.

Can the Sunnis be brought on board in the next week? Some Shia and Kurds have suggested that they might push through a draft constitution without Sunni support. But, reasonably enough, the Sunnis counter that they would then campaign against the draft when it came before a referendum in October. Under the TAL, the draft cannot be ratified if two-thirds of voters in three provinces vote against it; most likely, four of Iraq's provinces have Sunni majorities. And besides, any bid to steamroll Sunni objections would probably inflame the raging, Sunni-run insurgency.

As the squabbling grows, America has become more involved in internal Iraqi politicking than at any time since it, technically, handed over the country's sovereignty to the Iraqis last year. The American ambassador, Zalmay Khalilzad, has met regularly the leaders of each competing faction, and urged them to reach a consensus as quickly as possible. For them to do so, the Sunnis must accept that they no longer have the strength to dictate their country's course.

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