Putting steel into Karzai

Afghanistan's parliamentary elections

Sep 22nd 2005
From The Economist print edition

A relatively peaceful vote, but Afghanistan's future is still not secure

ONCE again, Afghanistan has confounded the doom-mongers. The parliamentary and provincial elections held on September 18th were violent, with 19 polling stations attacked by Taliban insurgents and a dozen people killed. Intimidation and fraud were evident, compounded by a confusing voting system, whereby each candidate stood as an independent. But this was much less chaos than had been predicted; local elections in Pakistan last month were bloodier. And if turnout was down on Afghanistan's uplifting presidential vote last year, at around 50%, it nonetheless bespoke strong support for democracy and for accountable governance. As a milestone on Afghanistan's post-conflict journey, this should be celebrated, but cautiously—for the promised recovery lies further ahead than ruination lies behind.

To the long list of Afghanistan's dysfunctional institutions may soon be added its parliament. By preventing its being organised around political parties, President Hamid Karzai sought to ensure a weak opposition to his strong executive. At first squint, this might look wise: preaching national unity, Mr Karzai has done heroic service. Yet it makes Afghanistan too reliant on one good man, who risks assassination daily, and whose weak strategic vision the ploy typifies. In future elections, the chance of a single seat in an ineffectual parliament will surely fail to persuade warlords to give up their guns.

In this election, as another example of Mr Karzai's weakness, few were obliged to give them up: of 207 “commander-candidates” identified before the poll, merely 32 were disqualified. This was woeful, it disgusted many Afghans, and Mr Karzai is to blame. Before the vote, he received assurances from the two foreign armies in Afghanistan—an American-led coalition fighting the Taliban, and a NATO-led peacekeeping force—that hell-raising from disqualified candidates would be robustly dealt with. He must now undo the harm his weakness has done, and ensure that no elected candidate, or other official, maintains a militia.

To persuade Mr Karzai to do this, his allies must add steel to their assurances. Even as America pledged to secure the poll, it plotted to withdraw several thousand troops next year. Amid the usual squawking from Germany and France over the ideal role for NATO troops, it was uncertain whether America's European allies would fill the breach as it would like. They must do so. There is more at stake than bolder leadership from Mr Karzai. There are the fights against the Taliban and al-Qaeda and against the Afghan drug dealers who supply 90% of the world's opium. And there is the future of multilateral state-building and, it could be argued, of NATO itself.

Ultimately, however, no western power can end the insurgency raging in southern and eastern Afghanistan, where over 1,000 people have been killed this year, including 77 Americans. That will take years, by bringing greater prosperity to these desolate regions, after first instituting badly-needed economic reforms at the centre. But an eastern power, Pakistan, could reduce the killing. Money sent from Pakistan, as well as sanctuary there for the Taliban leadership, underlies the insurgency's vigour. Pakistan's claim to be unable to police its rugged border no longer rings true: a good portion, adjoining its tribal areas, is now mostly controlled. So should the rest be, and Pakistan must arrest its old friends, the Taliban leaders. Failing this, it will seem more than hapless in the ongoing violence. It will seem complicit.

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