A damning finger points at Syria's regime

Oct 21st 2005
From The Economist Global Agenda

The UN’s investigation into the assassination in February of Rafik Hariri, a former prime minister of Lebanon, has pointed a finger at the regime of Syria's President Bashar Assad. But America and other powers will have to think carefully about how tough they should get with the embattled Mr Assad

A FABLE is often told to explain the Middle East to outsiders. A scorpion asks a frog to carry it across a river. The frog replies that the scorpion might sting and kill him. The scorpion reassures: “But if I do, we both die.” The frog agrees, and the scorpion stings him midstream.

Why, asks the drowning frog of the drowning scorpion? “Because this is the Middle East.”
When Rafik Hariri was assassinated in February in Beirut, some argued that the Syrian regime was such an obvious culprit that it could not possibly have done it. Hariri, a former prime minister of Lebanon, had become a vocal opponent of the decades-long Syrian occupation. What regime could be so obviously heavy-handed as to murder a prominent opponent with a truck bomb in broad daylight? Nevertheless, the suspicions of its involvement grew, inside and outside Lebanon, eventually forcing Syria to withdraw its troops and end its domination of its neighbour.

Syria protested, and still protests, its innocence but the bleak view of Middle East politics encapsulated in that fable seemed to be confirmed by a report on Hariri's death that was delivered to the United Nations Security Council on Thursday October 20th, pointing the finger directly at the highest levels of the Syrian government. Most importantly, it has fingered Asef Shawkat, who is Syria’s military-intelligence chief and brother-in-law to Syria’s president, Bashar Assad.

Since Syria is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Assad family, suspicion is sure to mount about how much Mr Assad himself knew. Providing further meat for conspiracy theorists, it emerged on Friday that the name of the Syrian president's brother, Maher Assad, had been edited out of the report shortly before it had been presented to the Security Council. The report originally quoted an unnamed Syrian witness as saying the president's two relatives were among a group of Syrian and Lebanese officials who decided to assassinate Hariri at a meeting in Damascus in late 2004. The edited version gives the witness's account of the meeting but omits the two top Syrians' names.

In addition, the report hints that Emile Lahoud, the pro-Syrian president of Lebanon, might also have been in on the plot. But intriguingly, it did not even mention Ghazi Kanaan, the former head of Syrian military intelligence in Lebanon, who Syrian officials said committed suicide on October 12th. His death, coming so soon before the UN report's submission, had seemed suspiciously convenient, as if perhaps he had been chosen as fall guy over the killing of Hariri.

The findings could destablise both countries, with ripple effects on the broader Middle East. Syria entered Lebanon in the late 1970s, when it was riven by a multi-sided civil war between its rival Christian, Shia Muslim and Sunni Muslim communities, with Lebanon-based Palestinian militants and an Israeli invasion further complicating the picture. The Syrian presence helped end the war in 1990 and stabilise the country thereafter, with the occupation accepted by war-weary Lebanese as a price worth paying.

Lebanon began to recover, and even to flourish, not least thanks to Hariri. He had made a fortune in construction and other businesses in Saudi Arabia, and brought his money and influence to bear on restoring Lebanon to its former glory as a relaxed and enjoyable centre of commerce and culture in the Arab world. He was twice prime minister but fell out with Mr Lahoud and left office in 2004 to campaign for an end to Syria’s military and intelligence presence in Lebanon. His murder brought about huge demonstrations in his home country and widespread international condemnation. France and America joined forces at the UN to pass a Security Council resolution calling for Syria’s exit from Lebanon, and the disarmament of Lebanon’s many militias.

But while Syria has pulled its troops out, it is suspected of maintaining many spies in Lebanon. In addition, Lebanon’s armed factions remain armed, most notably Hizbullah, a Shia militia backed by Iran and Syria that has carried on a long-running battle with Israel. After the Hariri killing, there were several small bombings of Christian targets, as Christians had led the calls for Syria to leave. There was worry about a potential relapse of sectarian violence. That turned out to be too pessimistic. But the UN report may revive such fears.

Mr Assad and Mr Lahoud deny any involvement, of course. But the UN report claims that Mr Lahoud received a phone call from one of the conspirators minutes before the bombing. It also claims there is evidence that Mr Assad's brother-in-law and top aide Mr Shawkat forced a Palestinian militant to claim responsibility in a video recorded weeks before the assassination.

The report also says the plot would not have been possible without help from Lebanon’s own spies and soldiers. Four pro-Syrian Lebanese generals have already been arrested, one having allegedly told a witness, shortly before the killing: “We are going to send him on a trip—bye bye, Hariri.”

Handle with care

In worried anticipation of the report’s consequences, the streets of Beirut have been unusually empty. But the political fallout has begun. Two Lebanese parliamentarians have called on Mr Lahoud to resign. The American ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, said the report “refers to lack of co-operation by Syria with the investigation, which is diplo-speak for obstruction of justice.” America and its European allies are discussing what to do next at the UN. Sanctions against Syria are a possibility. But America has also tried recently to handle the country delicately, since it has co-operated with America in rounding up terrorists. In any case, Russia, a permanent member of the Security Council, is steadfastly opposed to sanctions.

Now, however, Syria is feeling isolated and jumpy. America accuses it both of undermining the Israeli-Palestinian peace process—by harbouring and abetting terror groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad—and destabilising Iraq by letting militants cross the long Iraqi-Syrian border. (The link with Iraq is also illustrated by the fact that the Hariri bomber may have been an Iraqi tricked into thinking he was killing Iraq’s former prime minister, Ayad Allawi, according to the report.)

Bringing yet more pressure to bear on Syria over the Hariri affair could make its regime even more unpredictable and unco-operative. But the process will continue. Detlev Mehlis, the report’s lead investigator, will brief the Security Council on October 25th. He has also asked for two more months to finalise his conclusions. Prosecutions of the perpetrators could take place in Lebanese courts, or could come in the form of some kind of international tribunal, as Hariri’s son has requested. But without co-operation from Syria, progress could be difficult.

Could the affair destabilise the Syrian regime? Though American neo-conservatives loathe Syria, and it was rumoured to be the next stop for America’s army after Iraq, undermining Mr Assad could be a dicey proposition. The local opposition to the regime, such as it is in a police state, is fragmented. On October 16th, opposition groups joined briefly to issue a declaration calling for democratic reform. But they are far from constituting a group that could take power if Mr Assad should fall. America has its hands full in Iraq, and knows that Syria can help ruin talks between Israel and the Palestinians. It must think carefully over just how tough it wants to get with the prickly, difficult regime in Damascus.

Copyright © 2005 The Economist Newspaper and The Economist Group. All rights reserved.