A difficult pairing, an uncertain outcome

German politics

Oct 13th 2005 BERLIN
From The Economist print edition

Germany's new coalition could be more, or less, than the sum of its parts—as its chancellor-in-waiting, Angela Merkel, knows too well

ASKED how political coalitions are formed, Germany's chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, once shot back with a question of his own: “How do porcupines mate?” After a short pause, he then answered it with a grin: “Very slowly.” The coupling of these prickly creatures is probably an accurate enough metaphor for current political events in Germany. Having fought each other tooth and quill for more than three decades, the Social Democrats (SPD) and Christian Democrats (CDU)—along with Bavaria's Christian Social Union (CSU)—are now coming together in an awkward embrace.

After a three-week-long mating dance, they finally got serious on October 10th, with a decision to make the opposition leader, Angela Merkel, the new chancellor and start formal talks on a partnership. Yet it will take at least another four weeks before this union is fully consummated: many decisions have yet to be taken, including the composition of the cabinet.

Some things in German politics remain constant, not least Mr Schröder's penchant for dramatic outbursts. In an emotional speech on October 12th, he confirmed he would not be part of the new government—and denounced “Anglo-Saxon” economic policies which, he insisted, would never work in Europe. Attacking America's response to Hurricane Katrina, he said it was a case of what happens “when the organised state is absent.”

The chancellor's temperament aside, almost everything is in flux—but at least things are moving in the right direction. After the election on September 18th, it seemed that Germany had voted itself into a corner: the governing coalition of SPD and Greens had lost their majority, while the opposition of CDU/CSU and Free Democrats had failed to win one of its own. Even last week, after the opposition won an additional seat at by-elections in Dresden on October 2nd, Germans were still bracing for many weeks of political gamesmanship. The SPD insisted that Mr Schröder remain at the head of the government, while the CDU/CSU did not even want to start real negotiations until he was pushed aside and Ms Merkel had been accepted as the new chancellor.

Yet over the weekend, both politicians, as well as Franz Müntefering and Edmund Stoiber, the bosses of the SPD and CSU respectively, reached a power-sharing deal that essentially cuts the differences in half. Ms Merkel will become Germany's first female chancellor and the first from the country's ex-communist, eastern part—crowning a breathtaking political career that began only 15 years ago, after German unification. In return, however, the CDU/CSU has had to pay a high political price. The SPD will get more policy portfolios: eight versus six. It will control some of the weightier ministries (such as foreign affairs, finance and justice), while the CDU/CSU will have to content itself with some less prestigious ones (such as economics, interior and defence).

Equally important, Ms Merkel has had to make big policy concessions, although insiders insist that they are only tactical in nature. At any rate, a four-page memo summarising the negotiations offers comfort to the SPD on many points that the party (especially its left wing) holds dear. Yes, the new coalition would simplify Germany's baffling tax system and do away with many tax privileges—but not the exemption for extra pay for night and holiday shifts. There are also plans to facilitate company-level wage deals (as opposed to sector-wide bargaining), but this change will not be mandated through legislation, as the opposition had originally intended.

Taking their time over it

At a pace which seems rather leisurely—Germany has been in political paralysis since Mr Schröder opted for early elections last May—the parties have set November 12th as a deadline to come up with a final cabinet list and negotiate a detailed coalition agreement. And it will probably take at least another week until the Bundestag, Germany's lower house, will be able formally to elect the new chancellor, who will then pick her cabinet: the whole deal first has to be approved by congresses and the parliamentary groups of all three parties involved.

Given the long and arcane procedure, much can still go wrong before the new government is in place. For one thing, drawing up a cabinet list will be a tortuous affair—for the CDU/CSU because of the paucity of portfolios, and for the SPD because its bank of talent is so near to being empty. Only Mr Stoiber knew early on what portfolio he would get: the economics ministry, which will be extended to include technology and harmonisation with the European Union. (At the same time, this ministry will be stripped of its recently acquired responsibility for labour affairs, leaving that job for the Social Democrats.) As for the other five ministries for the centre-right, even Ms Merkel herself seems not to have made any decision: “I'll tell you when I've finished thinking,” she said disarmingly this week.

On the SPD side, several ministers are going to keep their jobs, notably Ulla Schmidt (health and pensions) and Brigitte Zypries (justice). Mr Müntefering will become deputy chancellor, and also labour minister. Peer Steinbrück, ex-premier of North-Rhine Westphalia, is set for the tough job of finance minister. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, a prudent aide of the outgoing chancellor, has been nominated by the SPD as foreign minister.

Mr Schröder's supporters would have liked him to take the deputy chancellor's job, but he balked at serving under Ms Merkel. Still, he will remain part of the negotiating team—to help make the grand coalition a success, or so he has said. His departure underlines the fact that the SPD's pool of expertise is severely drained. Mr Müntefering, who is already badly needed to keep the parliamentary group and the party under control, will now have his hands full with two top jobs. Matthias Platzeck, the premier of Brandenburg, and one of the SPD's few real political stars, flatly refused to accept any of the senior positions on offer.

The government agenda also risks looking all too familiar. Since Mr Schröder lost the election mainly because of his reform package called Agenda 2010, and Ms Merkel didn't win it because she had announced that she would push reforms even further, the mood is not in favour of experiments. Yet it may still prove difficult to get agreement through the parties' congresses. The CDU will probably approve a deal on November 14th, although there is criticism that Ms Merkel paid too high a price for becoming chancellor. Her internal opponents—Christian Wulff and Roland Koch, the premiers of Lower Saxony and Hesse respectively—could still try to attack her if she runs into difficulties.

What will happen at the SPD's meeting in mid-November is even less clear. The party's mainstream had vowed never to vote for Ms Merkel and is worried that the SPD accepted too many difficult portfolios while letting the other side take potentially more popular jobs. Meanwhile the left wing may quickly realise that its position in a grand-coalition government will be as weak as under Mr Schröder. And the SPD has a history of tumultuous party congresses, occasionally ending in fisticuffs. In 1968, when it met to vote on Germany's first grand coalition (1966-69), Herbert Wehner, then the chairman of the party's parliamentary group, ended up with two teeth missing.

All this raises the question of what will happen if the political porcupines fail in their attempted coupling. In this case, it will not only be the protagonists that end up scarred—but Germany's democracy, too. The immediate result would probably be new elections—and in the longer term, a loss of confidence in the country's main political players, apparently incapable of getting their act together, even when the entire nation is urging them on.

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