Who will run the show next?

Iraq's election

Dec 8th 2005
From The Economist print edition

The West and most neighbouring Arab countries want secular-minded parties to do better, but the Islamists, egged on by Iran, will probably triumph again

THE tension is mounting in the run-up to Iraq's general election on December 15th. The killing, mostly of Iraqis by Iraqis, has not abated. Earlier this week, at least 36 police cadets were killed by two suicide-bombers, probably fellow cadets, in Baghdad's police academy—one of the bloodiest such deeds for several weeks. Last week ten American marines were killed by a roadside bomb, the highest one-day toll of Americans in four months. But hopes are still high, among those seeking to build a federal and democratic Iraq, that the election will produce a parliament and government even more representative and legitimate than those that emerged after the poll in January, when the rest of the world was so struck by the size of the turnout and by Iraqis' determination to choose their own leaders.

The antagonism between some of the leading candidates, aside from the spectacle of insurgents and government forces killing each other, has sharpened. Last week a former prime minister, Iyad Allawi, a secular-minded Shia Arab whose candidates' list is the most prominent rival to the dominant and strongly Islamist force in the outgoing parliament, the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), was attacked by a crowd of Shia radicals on a campaign visit to the holy city of Najaf. “God curse Baathists!”, they shouted, referring to his past membership of Saddam Hussein's party, as they pelted him with stones and shoes. A furious Mr Allawi said he had been subjected to an “assassination attempt”, and promised to “cleanse the country” of such “hurtful rebels” once he took power.

The bitter conflict between Mr Allawi and the UIA is yet another fissure in Iraq's already divided body politic. The Shia-led coalition, widely known as “the clerics' list”, that swept the board in January's poll, with 48% of votes cast, has shed many of its secular-leaning members. It is now a straightforward alliance of Shia Islamists, including the radical movement whose members follow Muqtada al-Sadr, a firebrand cleric, and were probably responsible for the Najaf attack. The UIA's leaders promise to intensify the counter-insurgency against Sunni Arab fighters, and show little sympathy for former military officers or Baath party members who say they have been unfairly treated.

Thanks to a new electoral system and the widespread political mobilisation of Sunni Arabs, the UIA's share of the vote will probably go down. In January, parties competed on a single national list; since most Sunni Arabs boycotted the ballot, they ended up with scant representation. This time, each province, including the four mainly Sunni Arab ones (out of 18 in all), will have its own list, so Sunnis will be far better represented, however few of them turn out. Nonetheless, the UIA will do well, because the Shias' most influential clergyman, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, has implicitly blessed it, after some hesitation due to his reluctance to immerse himself in partisan politics. He told his followers to vote only for a list that backs “religious and national principles”.

Mr Allawi's slogan, “Iraq for all Iraqis”, is a dig at the Alliance's perceived Shia sectarian bias. He has enlisted Sunni allies such as the current parliament's speaker, Hachem al-Hassani, and a former president, Ghazi al-Yawer, and has courted Sunni votes by damning the present government's human-rights record as comparable to Saddam Hussein's. In January, Mr Allawi got 14% of the vote, and hopes to improve on that. He has drawn some support from Shia secularists, military families and others opposed to the UIA's clerical links and its ties to Iran. He also hopes to pick up more support from the many Iraqis dissatisfied with the government's failure to improve security or boost the economy; electricity in most towns still works only for a few hours at a time.

But Mr Allawi no longer has the advantage of incumbency, which he used in January to promote himself as a strong leader who could put Iraq together again. Moreover, the UIA blamed much of Iraq's economic failures on corruption in Mr Allawi's cabinet. In addition, though many Shias dislike their present rulers, they dislike even more the idea of letting anyone connected with their former Baathist oppressors regain a foothold in the state. Sadrist newspapers describe Mr Allawi as “Saddam without the moustache”. Some Shia media outlets say that the CIA and Sunni Arab countries are trying to engineer an Allawi victory and that the Americans, having toppled the old Sunni Baathist regime, are trying to impose a new Baathist one—with a Shia veneer.

Many Sunnis, particularly those outside Baghdad, may opt for new coalitions of their own co-religionists that have formed in the last few months, such as the Islamist-leaning Iraqi Consensus Front or the more secular-nationalist Iraqi Front for National Dialogue. Their leaders champion causes dear to the Sunnis, such as reversing deBaathification, reinstating those who served in the old army, freeing prisoners and removing American and foreign troops. But though some of the Sunni fronts include well-known figures, none has acquired the sort of voice that the UIA gives the Shias or the Kurdish coalition gives the Kurds. So many Sunnis may vote for local tribal or religious candidates.

But will they vote at all? Many radical Sunni insurgents still oppose holding elections, though there have been few reports of explicit threats against would-be voters. The influential Muslim Scholars' Board, a group of Sunni clergy which led the boycott in January, still in principle opposes an election under foreign occupation. But most Sunni politicians have learnt the cost of not taking part in the political process. They particularly want to regain a foothold in the security ministries, which they think have become instruments of Shia oppression of their communities.

The Kurds, who make up about a fifth of Iraq's people, alongside the Shia Arabs (60%) and the Sunni Arabs (20%), are likely to vote for a coalition of the two parties who monopolise power in Iraq's three northern provinces. Despite discontent, especially among young Kurds, over the cronyism of this ruling duo, it should win easily; tribal networks in the villages help ensure its dominance. Reports from the northern province of Dohuk that an Islamist office has been attacked by a mob and four campaigners killed suggest that the election there may turn nasty.

Some American and western officials in Baghdad hope that Mr Allawi can stage a comeback, even with a modest share of the vote, since many Sunni politicians say that they would back him as prime minister. In any event, western leaders hope for a broad-based government, including some prominent Sunnis, in the hope of pulling the more secular-minded insurgents into peaceful politics. However, the UIA's power base is so wide, and its sense of entitlement as the Shia majority's main voice so strong, that it will be loth to endorse a prime minister from outside its ranks. The Alliance is particularly hostile to Mr Allawi.

But the Shia Islamists are themselves divided at the top. The Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) is the toughest and best organised of their main parties. The bumbling current prime minister, Ibrahim al-Jaafari, of the Dawa party, is said to want to keep his job but is unlikely to do so. Adel Abd al-Mahdi, the able former finance minister who is a SCIRI man, has a fair chance of replacing him. If he does, he may be shrewd enough to build a broader coalition government.

In any event, a new government may take weeks or longer to emerge. It must then, if it is sensible, amend the constitution to reassure the Sunnis that they will get a fair deal in the new Iraq. At that point, all being well, more insurgents might accept the new order, a newly legitimate government may begin to assert itself, and the Americans and their allies could start gradually leaving. There is a very long way to go before that may happen. But the upcoming election should be a big milestone on the way.

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