A relationship reconsidered

America and China

Mar 23rd 2005 BEIJING, SEOUL AND TOKYO
From The Economist print edition

But the problems of North Korea and Taiwan still rankle

“CHINA”, wrote Condoleezza Rice when George Bush was first running for the American presidency, “resents the role of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region”. During a visit to China as part of an Asian tour in her new role as secretary of state, she diplomatically avoided such bluntness, remarking instead that America and China shared common interests in regional and global stability. But on two of the region's paramount security issues, North Korea and Taiwan, Ms Rice did not find the Chinese all that helpful.

She made clear that America was growing impatient with the lack of progress in the Chinese-hosted six-way dialogue on North Korea's nuclear programme that also includes South Korea, Japan and Russia. On March 21st, at the end of her six-nation trip, she told reporters in Beijing that America remained “committed” to the talks, even though North Korea is now refusing to participate. But she also said that if North Korea remained obdurate, “we will have to look at other options”.

What might these be? Cracking down harder on North Korea's trade in weapons, drugs and counterfeit dollars would be one possibility. Taking the problem back to the United Nations Security Council might be another. To America's undoubted annoyance, China's leaders showed no obvious sign of willingness to step up pressure on the North to re-enter the talks, let alone make concessions.

America has not made clear quite how it would like China to lean on North Korea. China provides vital food and energy supplies, but is opposed to the imposition of economic sanctions on its communist neighbour and notional ally. It is worried that such measures could destabilise the impoverished country in ways that could threaten China.

Adam Ward of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London says America has no real expectations that China will impose sanctions at this stage or agree to put the issue to the Security Council. But he argues that the Americans would at least like China to signal to North Korea that it might be willing to adopt a tougher policy and that North Korea's claimed (though not yet proven) possession of nuclear weapons is an issue that also affects China's security.

Some Chinese officials may indeed want to be more co-operative with the Americans, not least because North Korea's nuclear programme gives the United States an excuse to maintain a strong security presence in East Asia and Japan an excuse to bolster its armed forces. But others worry that undermining the North Korean regime could allow America to dictate the terms of eventual reunification of the peninsula and deprive China of a strategic buffer against American forces.

The Russians show no interest in pressuring North Korea either, and even South Korea is at times disturbed by American rhetoric. During her swing through the region, Ms Rice was at pains to reassure all involved that America respected North Korea's sovereignty. She insisted that America has no plans to attack or invade the country. Such remarks were well received in South Korea, where there had been fears of escalating tension between America and North Korea following Ms Rice's description of the north as an “outpost of tyranny” in January. She repeated American offers of economic assistance as part of a settlement of the nuclear issue.

On China's relations with Taiwan, Ms Rice said China's adoption last week of an anti-secession law, which threatens the use of “non-peaceful means” against the island should it assert its independence was “not a welcome development”. She was considerably blunter in her criticism of the European Union for considering lifting the embargo on the sale of weapons to China it imposed in response to the crushing of the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989. More than once, she warned the Europeans not to do anything that would alter the balance of power in Asia. “It is the United States—not Europe—that has defended the Pacific,” she said.

The Europeans at least may be paying heed. On March 20th, Britain's foreign secretary, Jack Straw, said political problems relating to the embargo's lifting had become “more difficult” as a result of lack of progress by China on human-rights issues as well as the passing of the anti-secession bill. Recently, European Union officials had suggested that the embargo could be scrapped by the middle of the year, albeit with the introduction of restrictions on the sale of weapons to China.

Yet for all their differences, the Americans and Chinese both appeared keen not to let human rights get in the way of their discussions. Shortly before Ms Rice's visit, China freed a prominent political prisoner, Rebiya Kadeer. Ms Kadeer, a businesswoman from the western province of Xinjiang, was arrested in 1999 while on her way to meet an American congressional delegation. She was accused of harming national security. In apparent response to her release, America said it would not seek to censure China during this year's meeting in Geneva of the UN Commission on Human Rights, which began last week. Notwithstanding Mr Straw's concerns, Ms Rice said in Beijing that there had been “some progress” on human rights in China in recent months.

Ms Rice's eagerness not to ruffle feathers in China was also evident in Tokyo, where she was asked to explain her description of China as a “strategic competitor” before she joined the Bush administration. It shows, she said, that you should not write an article and then go into government: “People might actually read it.”

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