Now for the hard part

Oct 26th 2005
From The Economist Global Agenda

Iraq’s voters have approved its constitution in a referendum, though the vote closely reflected the country’s sectarian divisions. Will the process that is now set to begin draw disaffected Sunnis away from the insurgency and into politics?

EARLY projections nearly all said that the Iraqi constitution would be approved in the referendum held on October 15th. But in the end it was closer than expected, with the final results announced only this week. If three provinces rejected the document by a two-thirds margin, the constitution would be dead and the process would begin all over again. Two provinces had already said no, overwhelmingly. This left the result hinging on the province of Nineveh, whose voting tally was finally announced on Tuesday October 25th. Nineveh voted no, but not by enough to kill the constitution: 55% were against it. The document has thus been ratified.

But even the sunniest optimists, including the war-backers in the Bush administration, have learned from bitter experience not to rejoice yet. The insurgency continues to bleed America’s army (2,000 dead so far) and, with a far greater toll, Iraqi soldiers, police and civilians. And the vote on the constitution showed that the country remains as divided as ever. Shia Arabs make up about 60% of Iraq’s population, and Kurds around 20%. These two groups joined together to write most of the constitution, leaving the Sunni Arabs, who make up most of the remaining 20%, feeling shut out of the process.

The final vote tally, 79% for the constitution and 21% against, is worryingly close to the division of the country. Regional results show how clearly the vote followed sectarian and ethnic lines. The two provinces most dominated by Sunnis, Anbar and Salaheddin, voted against by 97% and 82% respectively, according to the official tally. Meanwhile, the Shia province of Muthanna and the Kurdish province of Arbil showed votes of 99% in favour. This led to accusations of fraud. A random audit of votes in three provinces, carried out at the request of the United Nations, found no evidence of tampering. But some Sunnis will no doubt still feel cheated.

Sunnis dislike the constitution mainly because it paves the way for a federal Iraqi state, in which provinces can join together to form regions with their own security forces. The Kurds and Shias are both eager to do this. Sunnis worry that a Shia super-region in the south of the country could come under the influence of neighbouring Iran. They also fret that they will see none of Iraq’s oil revenues, since most of the country’s oilfields are in Shia and Kurdish areas. Last-minute changes to the constitution, and the deferral of some key decisions on federalism and oil revenues, were meant to placate Sunnis. One main Sunni party, the Iraqi Islamic Party, endorsed the document in the end. But this did not stop its rejection by most Sunni voters.

The document’s passage sets the stage for the first elections to a fully constitutional Iraqi parliament. The question now is whether this process will begin to draw Sunnis away from the insurgency. They mostly boycotted the elections that gave Iraq a temporary government in January. But they turned out in far greater numbers for the referendum, and some leaders are encouraging another high turnout in the next parliamentary vote, which is due to be held in December. That way, they hope, a strong contingent of Sunnis will win seats in the chamber and work to amend the constitution. (A simple majority of deputies can put a constitutional amendment to a referendum.) The hope is that the process can create a coherent Sunni nationalist movement with credible leaders, working in the political mainstream. On Wednesday, three prominent Sunni parties, including the Iraqi Islamic Party, announced that they would form a coalition for the December elections. They are nationalist and anti-American, offering frustrated Sunnis their first official voice.

In the meantime, security will remain the priority. Violence preceded and followed the vote. Just one or two battalions of Iraqi troops have been trained and equipped well enough to operate independently of the American-led coalition. But optimists note that perhaps a hundred are now seen as ready to some degree, and Iraqi troops took a leading role in a recent offensive in Tel Afar, an insurgent stronghold. But even in Baghdad, violence is uncontrollable. On Monday, three suicide-bombers grabbed headlines by targeting two hotels in the capital used by western journalists and contractors. As usual, the victims were predominantly Iraqi.

Security officials have pointed to a substantial fall in the number of suicide attacks since the peak months of April and May. Such lulls have brought false reassurance before. But with all eyes now turning to Iraq’s first election of a full-term parliament, a pinpoint of light may be visible at the end of the tunnel. If Iraqis can begin settling their differences with political haggling and deal-making, rather than guns and bombs, that will bring forward the goal that everyone wants to reach, be they Sunni, Shia or Kurd within Iraq, pro- or anti-war in the West: the departure of foreign troops at a time when Iraq is ready to stand on its own.

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