Saddam in the dock as Iraq counts its ballots

Oct 19th 2005
From The Economist Global Agenda

Iraq’s deposed dictator, Saddam Hussein, has gone on trial, pleading not guilty to crimes against humanity over a massacre in 1982. The trial—the first of several he may face—comes as votes are being counted following last weekend’s referendum on Iraq’s proposed post-Saddam constitution. It is expected to pass despite opposition from Saddam’s fellow Sunni Arabs

ALMOST two years after Saddam Hussein was found hiding in a hole in the ground, and four days after the long-suffering Iraqi people voted on a proposed new constitution that (on paper at least) promises them the equality, freedom and democracy they so long lacked, their deposed dictator appeared in a Baghdad court on Wednesday October 19th, for the start of what may be several trials he will face over the enormities committed during his 24-years’ rule.

In this particular trial he stands accused of crimes of humanity for ordering the massacre and torture of more than 140 men from Dujail, north of the capital, following an attempt to assassinate him, as he visited the small town, in 1982. Standing in the dock, restrained by a white metal barrier, he refused to give his name when asked by one of the judges, snapping back: “I won't answer to this so-called court...Who are you? What are you? The occupation is illegitimate,” and adding, “I retain my constitutional rights as the president of Iraq.” He pleaded not guilty, unsurprisingly.

Saddam’s defence lawyers pleaded for the trial to be adjourned to give them more time to prepare. Their wish was granted—the case will resume in late November—though the chief judge said the postponement was mainly due to witnesses not turning up. If found guilty, the ex-dictator may face execution by hanging (or perhaps by firing squad, if the tradition for Iraqi military officers is followed), a sentence which would have to be carried out within 30 days of all appeals being exhausted. If so, he could be sent to the gallows before being tried on other charges, up to and including genocide.

The case will be shown on television across Iraq and around the world. Depending on how things go in this and the other trials, it is possible to imagine Iraq’s quarrelsome ethnic and religious groups being brought together by hearing of the terrible sufferings that his regime inflicted on them all—Shia Arabs, Kurds, even his fellow Sunni Arabs when it suited his purpose. But it is at least as easy to imagine the trial only serving to widen the most important split in post-Saddam Iraq: between the Shias and Kurds, who are largely hopeful about their prospects under the new order; and the Sunnis, who having lost the privileges enjoyed under Saddam now fear becoming an oppressed minority.

While many Shias and Kurds are keen to see Saddam swinging at the earliest opportunity, some Sunnis angrily complain that he will never get a fair trial, especially while the American-led coalition’s troops remain in the country. Saddam’s defence may also argue that his regime’s laws granted him presidential immunity and that this still applies to any charges relating to his time in power.

The trial opened as Iraq’s electoral commission was continuing to check returns from polling stations following last weekend’s referendum on a proposed new constitution—which went largely smoothly. Though the document was drawn up by a committee including representatives from the country’s main communities, and in spite of last minute amendments aimed at winning wider support among Sunnis, most of those Sunnis who did vote are thought to have rejected it. Nevertheless, the constitution is expected to have been passed, with Shias (around 60% of the Iraqi population) and Kurds (about 20%) mainly voting “yes”. To reject it would require a two-thirds “no” vote in three of Iraq’s 18 provinces but, of the four provinces thought to have Sunni majorities, only Salah Ad Din (Saddam’s home province) and Anbar are thought to have achieved such a level of rejection.

The declaration of the final result is being delayed by checks that Iraq’s electoral commission is making on returns from some regions whose “yes” vote was remarkably high—over 90%—though on Tuesday the commission insisted that such figures did not necessarily imply fraud.
The turnout is thought to have varied significantly between provinces but electoral officials have indicated that, overall, perhaps 63-64% of the 15.5m registered voters took part. This compares with the 58% seen in January's election, in which many Sunnis either refused to participate or were unable to, because of violence and intimidation. This time, voters in some Sunni towns turned out in force, if only to reject the constitution—in Fallujah, the scene last year of fierce fighting between American forces and Sunni militants, 99% voted “no”. At least it could be said that their participation in democratic politics was progress of a sort.

The improved turnout was a welcome surprise, given the lack of enthusiasm detected among even Shias and Kurds in the run-up to the vote. The months of bombings and shootings following January’s general election have shown them that politics alone is no panacea. Many voters complained before the referendum of not having received a copy of the document they were being asked to approve, even in parts of Baghdad, let alone the centre and west of the country, where the insurgency is fiercest.

This was in part because of the frantic last-minute negotiations to tweak the draft constitution, mainly to make it more acceptable to the Sunnis. Assuming it has passed, there will now be a fresh general election, in December, with a more proportional system of representation, in which many more Sunnis are expected to participate. A new parliamentary commission will discuss further changes to the constitution.

Plenty more work to do

There is much it could do to encourage more Sunnis to join the political process and thereby to undermine support for the violent insurgency. Sunnis fear that, since Iraq’s huge oil reserves are largely in the Kurdish north and the Shia south, they will be robbed of a fair share of export revenues. The constitution is rather vague on how the oil money should be shared, so this ought quickly to be clarified.

The constitution also allows provinces to group together to form a region with enhanced autonomy—which the Sunnis fear will lead not just to a breakaway Kurdistan in the north but also to a Shia “super-region” of up to nine provinces, with closer links to neighbouring Iran than with Baghdad. A ruling could be made to limit the size of such regions, to ease fears that the country will split into three.

As the political process, and the trials of Saddam and his henchmen, continue in the coming months, optimists will hope that support for the suicide-bombers will ebb and that those insurgent leaders who are nationalists rather than jihadists will be drawn into the political process. If so, the events of the past few days may come to be seen as the long-awaited turning-point in post-war Iraq’s fortunes. Or, if things continue to go badly and the country continues to slide towards civil war and eventual break-up, they may in retrospect be seen as little more than sideshows.

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