Twins together, Poles apart

Poland's election

Oct 27th 2005
From The Economist print edition

The electoral triumph of two tub-thumping brothers raises questions about Poland's enthusiasm for change

IF POLAND'S presidential election had gone as expected—with victory for a dull, worthy economic reformer—then the rest of Europe would hardly have looked up. Instead, the European Union's biggest newcomer gave its partners a rude shock, and laid bare some deep worries about the pace of social and economic change.

Even among Poles who rejoice over the end of communism, and therefore identify with the centre-right, there are still huge differences—and the traditionalist camp, with old ideas about the family, the farm and foreigners, is stronger than anybody thought. That, broadly, was the message delivered on October 23rd by the Polish electorate when it gave a 54% score to Lech Kaczynski of the Law and Justice (PiS) party, against 46% for his rival, Donald Tusk, from the pro-business Civic Platform (PO). Following a general election last month, in which the conservative parties trounced the left, the result snarled up a coalition building effort, under way since. Instead of a broad centre-right coalition, Poland faced the possibility of a minority government led by PiS and drawing support from the ultra-populist right.

On October 26th, relations between PO and PiS fell to a new low when, at the latter's behest, a zealously Catholic and Eurosceptic politician, Marek Jurek, was installed as speaker of parliament. PiS initially suggested that this post could go to a moderate figure, nominated by PO, but negotiations over top jobs apparently broke down. Bargaining continued, but from Civic Platform's viewpoint, it might be better to allow its rivals to form a fragile minority government, rather than share responsibility for a coalition over which it has little influence.

For the president-elect, Lech, and his twin brother Jaroslaw, the chairman of PiS, the presidential result capped an astonishing run of political success. The tub-thumping pair, who won national fame in 1962 as child film stars with sweet faces, have apparently found a winning formula in social conservatism, religious nostalgia and promises to assert Poland's interests. As mayor of Warsaw, Lech Kaczynski has barred gay parades, backed the death penalty and resisted pressure to adopt a more cosmopolitan style.

His brother, who might in theory have become prime minister after the general election last month, has nominated a modest teacher-turned-economist, Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz, for that job instead. But in Poland's political castle, Lech and Jaroslaw, who were born 56 years ago to a famous resistance fighter, have been left as king and king-maker respectively.

President Jacques Chirac of France was among the first European leaders to congratulate King Lech, and immediately invited him to Paris. That might be a telling sign. Instead of showing the world a reformist, centre-right face—in tune with Germany's chancellor-to-be, Angela Merkel—politics in Warsaw may be taking on a more Gaullist hue: nationalist and wedded to farm interests, with a dose of Polish clericalism thrown in. And among federally minded Eurocrats, the election result was greeted with muffled groans. Some took offence at the new president's dismissal of Brussels as “a city in which some kind of subsidies are agreed upon”.

Meanwhile, Poland's liberal, pro-European establishment was left wondering how it miscalculated the strength of traditionalist sentiment. Did people underestimate the fear of externally imposed change in a nation where outsiders have usually arrived as invaders?

It depends, of course, on which part of the nation you mean. It is hardly news that Poland's east and south-east—much of which used to be part of Russia—are poor and conservative, while the north and west—formerly part of Germany—are more liberal and open to change. In the ex-Russian regions, Catholicism was a badge of identity which marked Poles out from the Orthodox neighbours; people cling to it all the more fiercely. Those areas have an Orthodox minority, also conservative.

In the latest election, voting patterns followed the dictates of history and geography more closely than ever and in ways that were not always obvious. Most of the families who now live in the ex-German territories originate from the east, and only moved west after borders were redrawn in 1945. But that does not make them conservative now: life in formerly German lands, where the infrastructure is good and contact with westerners frequent, has made people more open to change. Nor is the east all conservative: in deep-blue places like Podlaskie, there are places where Mr Tusk did quite well—rich tourist areas.

If prosperity gives people “modern” views and voting habits, then liberals should be taking comfort. And people like Janina Paradowska, a political analyst, see crumbs of reassurance. “A large part of the population voted for a liberal vision of Poland. Where else would you see a party [like PO] with such a liberal economic agenda getting such wide support?”

Wide, but apparently not wide enough. Some Poles had hoped they might finally get a government dominated neither by cynical ex-communists, nor by moralising anti-communists fixated on the past. They may have to wait a while longer.

Copyright © 2005 The Economist Newspaper and The Economist Group. All rights reserved.